Who am I? Introduction to Personal Identity | Alex Abbott | Skillshare

Who am I? Introduction to Personal Identity

Alex Abbott, I like to think!

Who am I? Introduction to Personal Identity

Alex Abbott, I like to think!

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6 Lessons (40m)
    • 1. Introduction to the Course

    • 2. The Problem of Persistence

    • 3. The Bodily View of Personal Identity

    • 4. The Brain Transplants Argument

    • 5. The Psychological View of Personal Identity

    • 6. The Long life Problem and Conclusion

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About This Class

Who am I? What does it mean to say I am a person? These are all very interesting and complex issues that are essentially at the heart of a lot of our day to day discussions. Whether it be discussions about ethics, law, politics or psychology, the issue of personal identity has always been a deeply important question. In this course, we are going to be exploring these issues by taking an introductory course in the Philosophy of Personal Identity. Here we are going to be exploring issues around what makes me me, and what makes me 10 years ago the same person as me today. 

Course Structure:

This course is split into 5 main lessons: 

1. The Issue of Personal Persistence

2. The Bodily view of Personal Identity

3. The Brain Transplants Argument

4. The Psychological View of Personal Identity

5. The Long Life Response to the Psychological View

In all these lessons we are going to be exploring and critiquing the Philosophy to see if we cannot better understand what it means to be human and what it means to interact with other humans. 

This is a completely introductory course for all. NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE IS REQUIRED. 

Meet Your Teacher

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Alex Abbott

I like to think!


Hello, I'm Alex. I have a BA in Philosophy from the University of Nottingham and am currently in the process of getting an LLM in Law. In the future I would love to pursue academic studies further and go on to do a PhD. I have a keen interest in teaching people what I have learned in fun and interesting ways. My primary expertise include Metaphysics, Logic, the Philosophy of Mind and Ethics. I shall be making courses on some fun and interesting areas of Philosophy. 

My Current Courses include: 


- Can Computers Think? Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.

- Who am I? Introduction to Personal Identity

- A basic introduction to stoicism

- Introduction to Formal Logic

- Introduction to the P... See full profile

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1. Introduction to the Course: hello and welcome to an introduction to personal identity for the course who are my introduction to personal identity. So we're going to in this lesson is we're gonna go through an overview. We're gonna look at what personal identity is, and then we're gonna have a look at what this course is going to be structured. Like So, Really, What do we mean when we talk about personal identity? Well, personal identity is just really what we would describe as the status of being a person. The question off who we are as people is a deeply important philosophical question. It also has very important implications in science, psychology, law in politics. The question off what is to be a person is also a lot linked a lot with ethical issues such as abortion. On Gwen, there are no people. Can people conceived at conception? You know, people are put that fetus is a person of conception, or rather, that it is when they are born or when they have a heartbeat, for example. So these are all issues that are really intertwined with this issue of personal identity, something that we're gonna have to work out if we're gonna try and solve these problems. So in this course, we're gonna ask a simple question. And that simple question is, just who am I? What do we mean? When we're talking about personhood on personal identity, this course is gonna be over a number off the main issues in the philosophy of personal identity. We're gonna love a look at the question of persistence when it comes to personhood. We're gonna have a looker one view off personhood, which is known as the bodily view off personal identity. We're gonna look at the brain transplants argument, which is on argument against the bodily view. We'll have a look at the psychological view of personal identity on we're gonna have a look at the long life problem, which is also a critique off the psychological view. So we're gonna be really mainly covering two main aspects off personal identity to views that really are quite contradictory in their nature, but at the same time have problems within themselves. So we have a look at the bodily view and the psychological view. The what? What makes us a person the next time we have looked at the problem persistence on this is not just who we are, but what does it has. It makes sense that we exist over a period of time. Andi. As a lesson task. I'd like you to just find out ways. The question of personhood impacts the law. Impact Politics impacts ethics on the impact sciences psychology How does personal identity have any kind of impact in those four or five main disciplines? 2. The Problem of Persistence: in this lesson. We're gonna have a look at the question off persistence when it comes to personal identity . So we're gonna be outlining a few basic terms that we need to really understand. If we're gonna try and understand the philosophy of personal identity on then in the next few videos, we're going to start looking at actual theories of personal identity and seeing how we can maybe critique them all, make them make them better. So specifically, in this lesson, we're going introduce the issue of persistence. We're gonna work out how we can formalize it in its in its or formal philosophical way. We're gonna have a look at the difference between necessity and sufficiency when it comes to necessary, persistent and sufficient, persistent. So what is the issue off persistence? The question we're gonna asking This, of course, is who am I? But in order answered this question properly, we must also look at the issue of persistence on the problem of persistence is in attempting toe Answer the problem. Persistence. What we're trying to do is ask ourselves, how do we exist over time? Not just who am I at one particular point, but what allows me to exist over a period of time I e. Over someone's lifetime. So what other things that makers exist for? One point in time toe another. A more formal way of writing and understanding. The issue of persistence is, let's assume that a person X exists a set point in time, a Time t one. It's hard enough to answer the question of what makes X a person a T want. But I want to do is ask another question. We want to ask if we have some entity, why that exists at a different time. Time t to If X is equal to why that means that X and y the same person. So this means that X doesn't just exist at time t one. They must also have to exist at time t to on. Therefore, they have to persist through from time t one time t to like so on. The question is, what other things? What is it that allows us to persist as a human as a person, as a you know, through personal identity from a point and time t one on a point at time t to it could be what makes this person X being me. That's existing. A set point. Time to one. That's a my 10th birthday. What does on then? If we take something that exists Time t two, which is say, when I'm 20 my 21st birthday. What does it mean to make those to the same person? How do we work out how something comes? How somebody can persist through that time? That's what we're trying to answer. Okay, so this sound might Savary pedantic, a very pedantic way to formalize it. But it is very important. The idea of persistence involved what we call numerical identity. Which means this means that something is literally identical to something else. This is different to the idea of qualitative identity where things are the same. We say that they're identical because they share the same qualities. But in reality they're not actually identical. For example, if I had to take, if I had to, Green Ford focuses side by side. I would say that they are identical, but I wouldn't say that they are numerically identical. What I'm saying is that they are qualitatively identical. They have they share the same qualities. I e the quality of being a Ford focus on the quality of being green, but they're not numerically identical. They're not the exact same car. That's the point we're trying to work out here. How can we have two things that are exactly the same that exists at two different points in time? It is a very deeply metaphysical question. So in summary, the problem persistence is really a question of what does it take for a person to persist from one time to another? What does it take to continue rather than to just cease to exist? If I existed? Time t one. What's to stop me from not existing at time? T to on being something else? Okay, more philosophically, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for X to persist through time necessary? Meaning a necessary condition is something that most one must have if we have to exist. A sufficient condition is a little less powerful thes the conditions which are enough for somebody to persist. So what are the baseline? Absolutely required conditions that we need in order to solve this issue off persistence. And then that's what we would call a necessary conditions. While the sufficient conditions were talking about. What are the bare minimums, the bare minimum conditions that we need for persistence. So, really, how are we going to work out the question? Who am I or what are we? So we're gonna try and work out two questions. Really? What are we A Well, who am I? Andi? Under what conditions do we persist over time? On there are two philosophical formulations that we're gonna look at toe work out how personal identity works have Look at the bodily view of personal identity. When we look at the psychological view of personal identity, critique them both and have a look a really how we can improve both of them. In the next lesson, we're gonna have a look at the bodily view of personal identity on. Then we're gonna start to critique it later on. 3. The Bodily View of Personal Identity: in this lesson, we're gonna have a look at the bodily view of personal identity. This is the first of two theories that we're gonna be exploring in this course about how we can explain our ideas of personal our ideas of who we are as people so specifically recover , looking at it would do little introduction. In a recap, we're gonna redo a summary off the bodily view of of personal identity on we're gonna ask, why should we believe in the bodily view of personal identity there, the three main things we're gonna look at here so as an introduction, this is the first way we're going to look at the questions that we asked in the first lesson. And these questions are Who am I on? What all my persistent conditions, as in what conditions do I have that allow me to persist from point A to point B in time, looking at this, we're going to work out what we call the necessary conditions and the sufficient conditions for personal identity. So what is the bodily view off personal identity? The bodily view simply states that what I am fundamentally is my body. So my persistence conditions are just my bodily persistence conditions. So everything that I am that makes me a person is just everything that is physically a body towards me. Okay, so answering the questions of persistence is just answering questions. About what? How does a body persist on? This is our thesis. This is effectively the fundamental question off the bodily view. The bottle of you simply states that the only thing that makes a person a person that we could really describes a person is that they have a human body. Okay, how can we fit this into our philosophical theories, though the theories of identity, how Cohen has done the bodily view also by looking at the ideas of necessary sufficiency when it comes to the conditions of persistence, they're the things that are a little bit more complicated that we're gonna have to have a look at here. So according to the bodily view, a necessary condition for personal persistence is if I persist, it means my body persists. I simply cannot persist without my body. The only thing that is required on do the only thing that is required on the ultimate thing that is required for persistence for personal persistence is you have a body that also persists. That's a quart of the model of you. Or you could take a weaker claim towards the bodily view and since suggest that if I have a body, if my body persists, then that's a sufficient reason for me to believe that I, as a person, persists. Now these both. They're just different formulations of the bodily view. Fundamentally, when it comes to the salt, technical know how about persistence on about the bodily view or personal identity? We look at an in person X that exists at a time t one, and then we have a look at a thing, some entity that exists at time t to on what we want to do. Is it say, if these two things are numerically identical to each other? What are the conditions that have allowed this X to co persist from time to? You want to Time t two. That's that all the question of persistence is Andi, really The the bodily view just states that X equals Y X is numerically identical toe. Why if and only if that's what this little if with too efs means. If and only if X and Y are the same body. So what the bodily view is stating is that persistence from time T want to time T to occurs only because your body is persisting from time. T want time t to your body at time. T one is the same as your body at time. T to on this is effectively the bodily view. It's a simple as that it doesn't make any claims about what it makes, what it means to be her body. It just claims that if you have a body, you are a person. So when we talk about trying to work out what it takes for somebody to say that they have a body that becomes a little bit more complicated, the bodily view doesn't actually have ah leg in that fight. It doesn't actually make any claims about what you need to have a body. Do you need, you know, four limbs. Do you need heart? Dele to Long's Do you need a brain? All these things are no issues that are answered with the bodily view of personal identity . All the bodily view is stating that if we can all agree as to what it takes for something to have a body for you to have a body. If we agree that we agree on that now we come to some conditions that make something or body. Okay, if they have a body there, a person, that's what the bodily view is stating. Is there any reason to believe in the bodily view? Well, there's it seems that, you know, it seems quite intuitively, intuitively convincing. The philosopher Judas Jarvis Thompson is a supporter off the bodily view of personal identity. She says that it is the quote, simplest view off what people are says that simple is the most intuitive way of understanding it. She doesn't say that she inhibits her body, as in she is a thing that is inside her body. She says that she thinks that she is her body. Her body is the only thing that makes her her. There isn't just a there isn't just a you on your body, they're the same thing they're numerically identical on. She also made clear that when it comes to questions about what makes a body a body, she thinks that the idea of body is as a whole So, for example, if you were to lose a hand, this wouldn't make any difference to the bodily view because it's not the specific. It's not the specific, exact replica of the body that makes the bodily view makes you a person according to the bodily view. What it is is all the the set collective things that we could consider as a body. That is what makes you a person according to the bodily view. Now the task for this lesson is just to write a short little thesis for why one might support the bodily view. We've talked about it here in this blessing here and maybe can you think of any kind of issues with the bodily view of personal identity? We're gonna have a look at some issues in the next lesson under the start off the lesson afterwards. A few problems with the bodily view. Can you think of any of them before you even watch those lessons on? Specifically, we're gonna have a look at the brain transplants argument against the bodily view in the next lesson 4. The Brain Transplants Argument: What are some problems with the bodily view off personal identity? Well, for one, we can look at what is known as the brain transplants argument. Or maybe the brains transplant Fort experiment. And that's what we're gonna do in this lesson and have a look at why the bodily view isn't actually that convincing. As we might have thought, We're going to start by taking a little recap of the bodily view just to sort of get brush up on you know what it means and what it is. We will outline the brain transplants argument against the bodily view going outline what it says on. Then we're gonna discuss this a little bit more, a lot more detail. So when it comes to the re capping of the bottle of you off personal identity, the bodily view of personal identity states very simply. And it's most simple form that what we are is our body. If we have a body, we are people. Simple is that the philosopher Judith job is. Thompson argued that the bodily view is the simplest and easiest to understand is the easiest view to understand when it comes to the issue of personal identity. She said that the set of collective features that make up our body or what constitute personhood, and that's what really that is all that we can talk about when it comes to what makes a person a person, there are a least one or two key objections. However, I'm gonna look at the 1st 1 in this lesson, and I'm gonna look at that the 2nd 1 in the start. That next lesson. The 2nd 1 They're both relatively abstract, but they're also very relatively convincing at the same time. So we have a look at what is known as the brain transplants argument. This is a key argument against the bodily view of personal identity. Its view takes many different forms. While should do is look at the view taken by the philosopher Sydney Shoemaker, which is, yes, Israel name in his book Self Knowledge and Self Identity from, I Believe, 1969. So a very old, quite old piece of philosophy, really, it comes in the form of a thought experiment. Okay, let's assume there is some kind of advancement in medical technology where brains were able to have a brain where to take it out of the school, operate on it and then put it back in the school when it's fixed. That's not beyond the realms of possibility. When it comes to medical advancements, it's not something that is conceivably impossible. Way could think that that might be something that is possible to do in the future. Suppose there are two people going through this surgery at the same time. Now suppose that the surgeon makes him a stake in putting the brains back. He accidentally mixes up the brains so that they go into the wrong scores. So the two people they have their operation, but they put them in the wrong schools, so they put the brains back into the wrong bodies. These two patients are called Tom and Jerry. That's why I've got an image of Tom and Jerry here. He's just pick, pick two names out of a hat. Really? Well, pick two names from a famous cartoon series, but moreover, let's get back to it. Tom's brain is put in. Jerry's body on Jerry's brain is put on Tom's body, so they've switched bodies effectively. And then what happens is Jerry dies so Jerry's body dies so that means Jerry's body dies and Tom's brain also dies, and he is immediately cremated. So all that is left from this horrible experiment from this horrible surgery is Tom's body and Jerry's brain. We can call this person Terry as like a sort of amalgamation of the two. Now, according to the bodily view of personal identity. Terry, this new formulation is actually just Tom, because it is Tom's body that survives not his brain. It's only his body that survives, therefore, is actually Tom. If you were to ask somebody, you support the bodily view. It's Tom that has survived this experiment. Also, according to the bodily view, Jerry is debt and no longer exists because Jerry, his body is gone but not his brain. His brain is in Tom's body, but Jerry's body has been cremated with Tom's brain. Okay, however, when we asked Terry, who is the body of Tom, about his memories, his thoughts, his experiences, who he thinks he is, he takes Jerry's memories and Jerry's thoughts because it's Jerry's brain. So he has all the personality traits behavior experiences, memories, psychologies, mannerisms, every single everything that makes you know Jerry Jerry effectively. So it seems a lot more likely to suggest that Terry this amalgamation is in fact Jerry, not Tom. And that all has changed. Is Jerry's in a different body? When people interact with this amalgamation with Terry, they see his body on. They think he's Tom immediate, you know, at the start of the you know, their interactions. But when they speak to him and get to know him, it becomes immediately clear that he is Jerry just but just in Tom's body. So really, it seems to be the case that Jerry is not just his body. He survives when his body is is actually gone. Okay, so therefore the bodily view cannot be true. The bodily view of personal identity states that it can't be true. Seems as if we take this experiment into account is actually in fact Jerry who survive not Tom. So what is this look like in a formal argument? Well, we can take this into its on premise and conclusion form if we're gonna be really philosophical about him, OK? So we could have the first premise to suggest that if the bodily view off personal identity is true, no person could survive without their body on no person's body could survive without them. Okay, they're one in the same. Promised to Is Gerry survives without his body, according to the brain transplants thought experiment. We can accept that that to be true, we could also accept the truth. E solve the opposite that that Tom's body also survived without him without them without him existing. So, therefore, the bodily view is false. So effectively, What we're trying to say here is it doesn't make logical sense to accept that the dream brain transplants thought experiment could happen but also accept the bodily view of personal identity. It seems to be a lot more likely the case that what is somebody, what makes a person a person is more than just their body on the brain transplants. The experiment does highlight what it could be on. That is something to do with their brains, their thoughts or maybe even their psychology. Okay, so as a lesson task, you think anything wrong with a brain transplant argument? There are a couple of issues that people have taken the brunt. Brain transplants argument. Can you see if you can pick up and Anne on any of them on. Put it down in any kind of discussion area so we can have a little like debate going so we can see. You know, if if the brain transplants argument is really convincing in the next lesson, we're gonna have a look at the psychological view off personal identity, which is the second thesis off personal identity we're going to explore in this course. 5. The Psychological View of Personal Identity: now that we've looked at the bodily view off personal identity and we've also looked at one major issue with the body view of personal identity I'm gonna do in this video is have a look at the psychological view of personal identity, one that some suggest is a little bit more convincing. Onda doesn't fall into the same traps that the bodily view does as a lesson plan. What we'll do is going to recap the bodily view and also the dream that the brain transplants argument against it. We're going to outline the psychological view of personal identity on we're gonna explain the psychological view on why one should really be convinced by it. And we're also gonna ask ourselves the question. What psychological relation might help assistance consistent? So we have a look at solve different issues within the psychological view itself about really what? What allows us to persist from point A to point B in time? If we're going to accept the psychological view, we're also gonna have a look, a little bit of the star, another problem with the bodily view just to really, really hit home. Really, the issues, the bottle of you has so as a recap so far we've looked at the bodily view of personal identity. This view basically states that what makes you you is your body. However, some of rejected so this for a longer of reasons. One of those reasons is the brain transplants argument. Andi really? Is there another way we can understand personal identity? Andi, is there another way to really work out and discover who we are? So we can look at another objection to the bodily view off personal identity, which is the issue off teleportation. So let's look at the idea off teleportation from Star Trek. Okay, so a person in in this fictional universe in this fictional idea ah, person is de materialized in one location and then re materialized in another. How this works is that when you step into the teleport, the machine scans every single atom in your body, every single aspect of your physical being, and then you are destroyed. The machine then uses this scam that you have there is in the machine okay to duplicate your body exactly the same in a secondary location on then those you have been teleported to that secondary location but reality. What's happened is your first self has been destroyed and a different you has been created in a different location. Now this means there is no bodily continuity. You're completely destroyed. Your body, at least, is completely destroyed. How can we describe this and explain this, but also accept the bodily view of personal identity? Dance was you call. There's not really any way you can do that. There's no real possible way to accept this. This is physically possible onto also accept the view bodily personal identity. Now some have rejected this view that it is actually impossible to do. You cannot physically do this. However, it's what we would suggest is it is more so, definitely logically possible. It makes logical sense that we could do this on the idea of being physically possible. It's something that could conceivably be achieved in the future with future technology. It's not beyond the realms of possibility. So if we can accept that this is a possibility that could happen, then we still have to answer and ask ourselves the questions about the implications about personal identity that this brings up. You could explain how a person persists on how there is continuity if we look at these psychological view. So the psychological view is really one explanation for who we are and how we persist. And it's really the view that a person, a human person, consists of their continuation in psychological life. This is effectively the definition off the psychological view. It gets around the brain transplant arguments, since it allows for one's body to be destroyed and for you to personally still exist. So what you are is your brain, your psychology, everything that makes up your psychology. There's also the view also means that if your psychological life ends, you know your brain, your psychology on memories or experiences, Errol. That seems toe and then your personality cease to exists. Your personhood is removed at that point on. This is true, even if your body persists. Okay, On this guesses round quite neatly guesses around the brain transplants argument. The psychological view is supported for by a lot of people for a number of different reasons. So for one, it doesn't fall into the same kind of traps that the bodily view does to the idea of teleportation and the on the issue off the brain transplants argument could be explained away. If we reject the bodily view and we accept the psychological view, he also seems to make more intuitive sense than the bottle of you. The bottle of you is the most simple definition and explanation for how weaken explain personal identity but thesis ecological view a little bit. Mawr is a little more intuitively convincing appears to be the case that we are our brains and our thoughts and our experiences, etcetera. The's air old parts of our of our person. These are what make me me. But there's still some questions we have to ask for. One. What psychological relation might our persistence consistent? We've looked to the idea of personal identity. But what about the persistence of a person from point A to point B in time? How can we explain our persistence using the psychological view of personal identity? Well, one answer is that we have what we have. What we could have is the hour. Persistence could consist in our memory, so a past or future being might be you effin only if you can now remember an experience in your past, so memories could be the thing that really link? These are the idea of persistence together, the idea that something existing at Time t one and something existing at time t to they are identical. They are connected. There's continuity there because off the memories that they have, they have the same memory. Have this this readers of some problems. I don't remember everything from the past. Andi does. That doesn't mean that the past past me wasn't me, that there's not. There's still a continuity break here because you don't have to remember everything. And really, what does it mean to like? If we're gonna suggest that memory is what is what allows for our personal identity to persist through time, then what memories? Because no, every single memory is kept on no every single, you know, basically the point being that there is a break in continuity if you just forget something so it doesn't seem to be very convincing. A more convincing argument, which adds a little bit more elegance and complexity, could be the notion of causal dependence. So being is psychologically connected with you as you are now. Just if she is the same in the same psychological state. Okay, so we'll talk about both of these in the next lesson as a solver, A lesson task. Are there any reasons why you might want to prefer the idea of a causal dependence rather than memory for psychological persistence? So the idea of you having the same psychology, it being a collective thing rather than just being about memories, resources question, and come up transport with your own urine arguments and try and work out really what we could be talking about in the next lesson. The next lesson is the final. In this course, we're going to really attack the psychological view by looking at the long life problem. 6. The Long life Problem and Conclusion: So in this last video on this last lesson, I'm gonna have a look at a really a problem with the psychological view on Gonna look at the long life problem is quite short little video. And I'm gonna just summarize the whole course at the end. So in this lesson, we're gonna recap the psychological view on we're gonna look an interesting challenge. The psychological view which is known as the long life problem. So other recap. So in this introductory course, what we've looked at is two different views of personal identity. We've looked at the bodily view of personal identity on stated that really what makes a person a person? What makes me me is I have a body. We've also heavily critiqued the bodily view by looking at the drape that the brain transplants argument on the argument about Tele Forte Shin on. Really, we've We've come to the conclusion that we should really probably reject the brain transplants argument. Sorry. The sorry. The bodily view. We should really start to having a look at the psychological view as a more convincing way off trying to find out who we are. More count what? Our personal identity is the psychological view states that what makes you you is your psychological life and is thes psychological causal dependence the sort of chain of psychology that makes you you Can we find any reasons to challenge this view on we saw thought of a little This is, ah, reason that we touched on a little bit in the last video and then this really we're gonna have locked in 11 more detail. So let's have a look at another thought Experiment thought experiments of brilliant in these scenarios because they really do highlight some of the problems with some of the different theories that we've developed. So let's suppose I live for a very long time. Let's hope I hope this isn't actually a thought. Experiment is actually something that will happen. But for now, let's hope that I live for a very long time. I must persist through this very long time in order to say that I persist in there. It's the same person. So this say I I live 90 years. I must be persisting through that entire period of time to say that I am the same person from point A When I was born to Point B when I died. So that means there must be a sort of young version of me and middle aged version of me and an elderly version of me. Andi, Really? In reality, there's actually an infinite numbers of me infinite points in my life that we could pinpoint. But let's just for the same simplicity. We just have a look at three different versions of May. We spit it. We split my time line into three. In order for me to persist from being born to when I die as the same person. Why one has to equal why to has to equal why. Three. They all have to be one in the same thing or not to be running the same person. So if we're to believe the psychological view, I persist through that time from why one when I'm born toe Why three when I die? Because there is some psychological connection between why one y two of my three there is a link that goes all the way through all three of them. Okay, Now suppose that the why three version of me has some kind of amnesia or dementia or, you know, Alzheimer's. I have a direct causal link toe y two, but I have no link toe. Why one? Since I have no memory of my childhood as an old man Now, according to the psychological view and the also the law of transitive ity if, why one is equal to a Y two on why two is equal to why three, then why one has to be equal to why three. So we're accepting that. Why two on why three or equal on were also accepting that when I was a middle aged at Why to that I could remember my childhood so there's a connection there. But what we're rejecting is the notion that why one is related to why free? Because I have some kind of dementia or amnesia. So I cannot remember anything from my childhood. I have no, not only that, I can't remember anything. I have no experience known as standing nothing off my childhood, but according to a long life problem. Like I just said, there is no causal connection from what I want a y three. And if there's no causal connection between the two, then there's a break in continuity. Therefore, we can start to argue that that the the the personal identity and the persistence from when I'm born when I die, it cannot be grounded in the psychological view. So in general, really, what can we say about this argument? I don't think it's were particularly convincing argument because it really it misses a number of issues that we need to talk about. So there is no causal link between why one on why three is what it is saying. However, even with somebody with dementia or Alzheimer's or some kind of amnesia, just because they have no memory and no experience of their childhood, that doesn't mean that the events on the psychological states in their childhood didn't impact and influence there in later life. It's all built upon their later life. So just because there's no salt on the surface view of of my memory, I can't actually remember physical things happened at why one that doesn't mean why want still isn't causally linked toe? Why three, Even if you have dementia or Alzheimer's? Okay, that's one issue. Some also suggest that it's not just your psychology that could be used to explain why we can have a our breaking the chain. If you have other people around you who have experienced you and understand you from, why want a Y three? Then there's still this. They can still formulate this causal connection on they can still do that. So it really takes the sword individualistic idea of personal identity on looks to in a more in a broader in a broader range. Okay, and have a look at what other people would suggest. Now these are not, you know, these may or may not be particular convincing. We can have a discussion about whether these are convincing responses to the long life problem. But just as a general principle, that long life problem does formulate some questions for the psychological view off personal identity and as a course summary. What we've done in this course is we've looked at really we've acquired an introductory level of understanding off the philosophy of personal identity we have taken into account to views of personal identity. We've looked to the bodily view on we've loaded the psychological view. We've also explained both of them why they're convincing have also critiqued both of them. In particular, we've explored a number of interesting thought experiments, including the issue of teleportation, the long life problem and the dream. The brain transplants argument I do have you enjoyed? There is the philosophy of artificial intelligence as well on here. So there's, you know, plenty of other courses that are going to be coming out in the weeks and months to follow the's just short little introductory courses. Two different interesting issues. When it comes to philosophy and psychology. Andi things off that nature.